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In this paper, the author has analysed the perspectives of Macedonia’s 
new foreign policy concept regarding its neighbours since the second 
half of 2017. Therefore, he points to Macedonia’s numerous bilateral 
issues, primarily about its name with neighbouring Greece. The paper 
also includes a review of other open issues with Bulgaria and Albania, 
which jeopardize its path towards the EU and NATO membership.
The signing of two crucial bilateral agreements with Bulgaria (2017) 
and Greece (2018) has significantly changed its foreign policy position 
and accelerated the realization of its Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
Additionally, Macedonia has improved relations with Albania and 
Kosovo. Although the relations with Serbia have oscillated, they 
cannot, in general, be labelled as bad.
The author concludes that the determination of the new Macedonian 
political elite to resolve the accumulated bilateral issues with its 
neighbours is very significant in the broader regional context. It also 









XXV (85) 2019, 
90-114
Complex Historical Context of Macedonia’s Relations with its 
Neighbours
The Macedonian national question, as one of the 
controversial problems in Southeast Europe in the second half 
of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, has caused 
constant tensions and problems between Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Greece and since 1912 with Albania. (Gleni 1999: 205˗209) 
Namely, in the Ottoman Empire, along with its apparent 
weakening in the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century, several national movements in the Balkan Peninsula 
strengthened. (Lila 2017: 31–35) From all of them, only the 
Macedonian movement has failed to realize through the 
formation of a separate national state. (Pavlović 2001: 36–67) 
Serbia and Bulgaria, which were defined as separate states in 
that period, certainly contributed to this. However, Greece has 
also succeeded in gaining a particular influence in today’s 
Macedonia through the Orthodox clergy. (Gleni 1999: 205)
Attempts to impose their paternalistic position vis-à-vis 
the local population in Macedonia generated intensified 
internal tendencies in Serbia and Bulgaria to integrate this 
area into their composition. Despite the several uprisings of 
the Macedonian population on the territory of the Ottoman 
Empire, the most significant of which was organized in 
Kruševo on 2 August 1903 (Ilinden Uprising), Ottoman structures 
demonstrated extreme resistance to Macedonian ethnic 
identity and particularity. (ibid.: 210–215) At the beginning 
of the 20th century, there was significant opposition to the 
establishment of Macedonian identity from the neighbouring 
states, primarily Bulgaria and Serbia. Moreover, the Bulgarian 
historiography was mentioning the Ilinden Uprising as a part 
of the struggle of the Bulgarian population in the territory of 
today’s Macedonia, or as frequently mentioned in the “Western 
Bulgaria.” (ibid.: 209)
The most drastic conflicts between Serbia and Bulgaria 
regarding the issue of Macedonia were conducted in the 
Second Balkan War, i.e., during the end of June and July 1913. 
(Zundhausen 2008: 235–237) After that, the entire territory of 
today’s Macedonia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia. 
However, in the historical context and primarily because of the 
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has never been integrated into its composition. Moreover, the 
concept of complete denial of Macedonian ethnicity continued 
within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia 
after 1918. (Jančeva, Litovski 2017: 149–153) Not only did this 
lead to internal conflicts within the Macedonian population, 
but also to the strengthening of certain forces that conducted 
the Bulgarisation of the population and trying to increase the 
influence of the neighbouring state. The said was confirmed 
by the relatively easy and quick realization of Bulgarian 
occupation and annexation of this area after 1941. (ibid, 153–
158) Furthermore, a significant part of the western parts of 
Macedonia dominated by the Albanians was annexed to self-
proclaimed Greater Albania. (ibid.: 155)
During the second half of the Second World War, on 2 August 
1944 (the religious holiday Ilinden), the Anti-fascist Sobranie for 
the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was formed in 
the monastery of Sveti Prohor Pčinjski, re-affirming the ethnic 
and linguistic specificity of Macedonia as well as the status of 
the constituent element within the framework of the future 
Federal Yugoslavia. (Pravna enciklopedija 1979: 39) During 1944 
and 1945, the Democratic Federal Republic of Macedonia or later 
the People’s Republic of Macedonia was constituted. (ibid.: 39)
However, during this period emerged significant antagonisms 
with the Yugoslav neighbours about the identity issues of the 
Macedonians. Namely, since the constitution of ASNOM, Greece 
has denied Macedonia’s right to use the term of the Macedonia 
geographic region and attempts to link the history of Slovenian 
Macedonians with the legacy of ancient/Hellenic Macedonia. 
(Gavranov, Stojković 1972: 215–216) Also, neighbouring 
Bulgaria denied the existence of Macedonian ethnicity and 
the Macedonian language, considering that it was de facto 
Bulgarian ethnicity, as well as one Bulgarian dialect.
Until the Second World War, Serbian civil circles were not 
inclined to recognize Macedonian ethnicity, using the term 
“Old/South Serbia” for this part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
(Jančeva, Litovski 2017: 151) However, due to the anti-fascist 
struggle and the victory of the anti-fascist forces in Serbia, 
which have advocated the federal organization of Yugoslavia 
and the equality of its peoples, the official Serbian communist 
party and republican structures accepted this principle. It 
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as well as the Macedonian language. However, some Serbian 
nationalist dissident circles and part of the general public had 
reservations. Especially after the declaration of the autocephaly 
of the Archbishopric of Ohrid or the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church on 19 July 1967, which was part of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. (Đorđević, 2005) Since then, this issue between the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church has not only been broadly transposed to the relations of 
both Serbs and Macedonians, but also to the relations between 
Serbia and Macedonia. (ibid.)
Macedonian Independence since 1991 and newly expressed 
Problems with Neighbours
On the eve of the disintegration of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia embarked on the realization 
of its independence in extremely challenging conditions. 
Despite particular initiatives coming from this southernmost 
Yugoslav republic to preserve and transform the federal state 
through the asymmetrical federation, it, however, declared its 
independence in a referendum on 8 September 1991. (Katz 2014: 
191–210) Thus, Macedonia was again in a tough hard position, 
given the numerous oppositions from its neighbours, but 
without the former Yugoslav “protective umbrella”. (Jančeva, 
Litovski 2017: 166–167)
Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia’s 
independence (15 January 1992); however, the recognition 
of Macedonian ethnicity and language did not follow. (MFA) 
Thus, it significantly reflected the relations between the two 
countries and different interpretations of specific periods 
of their history, which, when it comes to neighbouring 
Macedonia, Bulgaria considered for its own. The tensions 
mentioned above were frequent, but Bulgaria has managed 
to strengthen its influence during this and previous decade 
by granting scholarships to Macedonian students, but also 
citizenship to its citizens. (B92 2006) Nevertheless, in general, 
the Bulgarian-Macedonian bilateral relations were rather bad, 
which threatened that Bulgaria would exercise the right to 
block Macedonia’s accession to NATO and the European Union.
Greece de facto did not recognize Macedonia following the 
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1995) However, these relations were at the level of the liaison 
offices, and since 2004 they were conducted through consular 
offices in Bitola and Thessaloniki. (ibid.: Article 1) On the 
other hand, Greece has consistently disputed the right to 
use the term Macedonia, but also the use of specific national 
and state symbols. Namely, the “Vergina Sun” displayed on 
the first flag of independent Macedonia had to be replaced in 
1995 with a redesigned flag. (Kornfein 2013: 83) Also, under the 
United Nations system, the name “Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia” was used for this country. (ibid.: 80) Greece has 
been persisting with this for more than two and a half decades, 
conditioning with this issue Macedonia’s accession to the 
European Union (since the end of 2005), and later to NATO (since 
2008). Despite significant US influence on the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest in 2008, Greece did not allow Macedonia to join this 
alliance under its constitutional name.
In this respect, Macedonia has filed a lawsuit in the 
International Court of Justice concerning the alleged violations 
of the Interim Accord. (MFAa) At the end of 2011, this court ruled 
that Greece had violated the Interim Accord. (ibid.) The official 
Athena, therefore, has been highly successful in utilizing the 
potentials for conditioning Macedonia on the path towards 
full membership in NATO and the EU. Macedonia was thus 
left on the verge of Euro-Atlantic processes, but also led to 
the strengthening of conservative and nationalistic political 
options and forces. Also, Greece and its church did not recognize 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and it should be noted that 
after the Second World War, a significant part of Slovenian 
Macedonians was forced to leave today’s Aegean Macedonia. 
(Gavranov, Stojković 1972: 215)
Macedonia and Albania established diplomatic relations 
in April 1992, and these were mostly related to the status of 
the Albanians settled in the western parts of Macedonia. 
(MFAb) Namely, even during the first decade of Macedonian 
independence, ideas to federalize the state through the creation 
of two monoethnic entities (Albanian and Macedonian) 
emerged. Hence, in 1992, the self-proclaimed Republic of Ilirida 
was declared, and significant conflicts between the Albanian 
rebels and Macedonian authorities lasted throughout 2001. 
(Vukotić 2014) This conflict ended with the Ohrid Agreement 
(13 August 2001), which was later fully implemented after 
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(Andonovski 2018: 23–49) It ensured the participation of 
Albanian representatives at all levels of the government 
in Macedonia. However, neighbouring Albania was more 
concerned with the question of “consistent implementation 
of the Ohrid Agreement” in the context of Macedonia’s NATO 
membership. (Blic 2015) Bearing in mind that Albanian political 
parties play a significant role in the political life of Macedonia, 
they have succeeded in actual influencing the constitution 
of power, i.e., the election of dominant Macedonian political 
options and the formation of the government.
Macedonia recognized Kosovo in the second half of 2008 
and succeeded in developing significant forms of bilateral 
cooperation, mainly economic. In this way, the relations 
between Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community 
have been further improved.
Serbia or the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
acknowledged Macedonia under its constitutional name as 
late as 1996, and the period of economic sanctions against the 
FRY (1992–1995) negatively affected the dynamics of mutual 
economic relations. (Đukanović 2016: 190) Apart from the 
non-recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church from 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, there were no major open 
issues in the relations between the two countries. Moreover, 
the first formal demarcation on the territory of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia occurred between the 
FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia in 2001. (Ugovor 2001) However, 
relations were provisionally exacerbated by Macedonia’s 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence in October 2008. It 
should additionally be noted that long-standing Macedonian 
Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski 
(2006–2016), has long maintained the most prominent political 
relations with the official Belgrade.
Deceleration of Macedonia’s Accession to the EU and NATO after 
2005
The persistent insistence of the European Union to overcome 
bilateral problems in the Western Balkans before it enters 
the finalization of the accession process has not yielded 
any meaningful results. This situation blocked Macedonia 
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candidate status for the EU membership in November 2005, due 
to neighbouring Greece and its blockade, it did not start the 
accession negotiations. (Đukanović 2016: 70) A similar situation 
was with NATO accession. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, 
Greece insisted on the change of Macedonian constitutional 
name, and with this slowed down the process. (ibid.: 94–95) 
That is why, in this period, Macedonia has gone into a certain 
self-isolation, lack of understanding of its own foreign and 
international position and has slipped to authoritarian 
tendencies and the growth of nationalism. The said situation 
has also been reflected upon by many international officials. 
Moreover, Macedonia has long been in the shadow of some other 
regional issues (such as the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
or the resolution of Kosovo’s status). (Torov 2010) It also caused 
Macedonia to step down from the position of “leader” in the 
entire Western Balkans region in the accession to the European 
Union and NATO and remain almost on the very margin of 
these processes.
Due to its stubborn political views and at the same time, avoiding 
any relevant public debate, the government embodied in 
VMRO-DPMNE has been trying to block any possible agreement 
with Greece over the name of the country. The said virtually 
completely stalled the EU and NATO integration process, but 
also led to the more visible attachment to some other actors, 
such as Russia and Turkey. (Nezavisne novine 2017) Moreover, 
it seemed that Macedonia would only “slip up” deeper in its 
hard positions towards some neighbours, above all Greece and 
Bulgaria, which are both the EU and NATO members. All this 
was followed by the internal re-traditioning of the Macedonian 
society, the increasing influence of the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church, and the strengthening of ethnonationalism. Apart 
from the above-mentioned, the linking of certain continuities 
of the contemporary Macedonian state and ethnicity with the 
ancient antique heritage was also historically very questionable. 
(Stanković 2012)
Formation of the new Government of Macedonia 2017
The threatened Macedonia to become a self-isolated state 
and captured into a multitude of open questions with its 
neighbours. The intense dialogue between the authorities and 
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lasted between 2015 and 2016, resulted in an agreement to hold 
parliamentary elections in late 2016. (DW 2016) However, these 
elections also manifested a traditional split between the two 
dominant options – VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic 
Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM), i.e., their electoral lists and 
coalitions. VMRO-DPMNE gained a minor advantage with 
38.14% of the votes (51 mandates), while the opposition SDSM 
won near 37% (49 mandates). (N1 2016) The dominant Albanian 
political parties – the Democratic Union for Integration, the 
Besa Movement, the Alliance for Albanians, and the Democratic 
Party of Albanians, together, won 18 mandates.
After the Albanian political parties decided to enter the 
coalition with the oppositional SDSM, it was clear that the 
country would plunge into a political crisis. Namely, it lasted 
171 days. Significant obstacles to the formation of government 
were also caused by President Gjorgje Ivanov, who gave his 
party colleague Grueski a mandate for the composition of the 
government even though he did not secure a parliamentary 
majority. (Politika 2018) When Zoran Zaev, leader of the 
oppositional SDSM, secured the parliamentary majority in 
the Sobranie on 27 April 2017, there was a particularly brutal 
physical attack on him and his party counterparts. (Novi 
Magazin 2017) Nevertheless, the crisis reached an epilogue 
when Brian Hoyt Yee, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Europe and Eurasia, visited Skopje on 1 May 2017, after which 
the entire crisis was channelled through the parliamentary 
procedure. (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2017˗) Consequently, on 31 
May 2017, five months after the parliamentary elections, a new 
Macedonian government was elected, headed by Zoran Zaev. In 
his numerous speeches, as well as in his presentation, Prime 
Minister Zaev emphasized the need to improve Macedonia’s 
relations with its neighbours. (Blic, 2017)
The basic principles of the new foreign policy of Macedonia 
after 2017: highlighted Euro-Atlantic integrations and good 
neighbourly relations in the Balkans
It is imperative to note the essential characteristics of the new 
foreign policy of Macedonia after 2017. In the first place, it 
focused on the prompt resolution of numerous problems with 
neighbours accumulated over the past years, and above all, 
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was a very demanding goal, which proved to be realistic in the 
first year and half of the new government led by Zoran Zaev. 
The willingness to get immersed in solving these problems is a 
fundamental difference to the earlier right-wing governments 
led by Nikola Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE. Although he 
occasionally sent signals, both to the EU and the USA, that he 
would solve these problems, former Prime Minister Gruevski 
did not do so primarily because of the resistance of the right-
wing part of the Macedonian public.
Macedonia has shown its commitment to good neighbourly 
relations by taking part in numerous regional initiatives and 
forums in South East Europe and the Western Balkans. The 
secretariats of several regional initiatives are located in Skopje 
(Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative – MAARI, 
South East Europe Health Network – SEE HN, Network of 
Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe – NALAS, 
etc. (Lopandić, Kronja 2011: 305–320)
The second complementary goal was related to the previous 
full implementation of the first one, which is the acceleration 
of Euro-Atlantic integration. In that sense, the country’s entry 
into NATO has been unblocked, and soon it is also expected 
to get a date for the start of negotiations on EU membership1. 
Showing the example of good practice in resolving relations 
with neighbours has contributed to the alleviation of tensions 
in the Western Balkans and throughout the Balkan Peninsula. 
By addressing the name dispute, the new Macedonian 
authorities have shown how important is good political will and 
determination of political actors to solve a highly complex and 
decades-old issue, without adverse effect on the vital interests 
of the Macedonian people and the citizens of Macedonia.
The complete complementarity of both goals and their 
implementation has contributed to Macedonia’s recognition 
as a constructive actor in the very turbulent Western Balkans 
and the equally unstable modern Europe. The significance of 
nearly three decades of Macedonia’s long strategic partnership 
with the United States should not be underestimated, which 
contributed primarily to the country’s emergence from a 
specific international (self) isolation, and then a successful 
1 The full membership of the Republic of Northern Macedonia to NATO is expected at the 
end of 2019 or early 2020 and the date for the start of negotiations on EU membership 
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re-affirmation after 2017. (Đukanović 2016: 122)
a) Further improvement of Macedonia’s relations with 
Albania
At the beginning of January 2017, in Tirana, leaders of Albanian 
political parties from Macedonia defined a unique platform 
under the auspice of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. 
(RTS 2017) It preceded the total turnaround of these parties 
from VMRO-DPMNE to SDSM regarding the forming of a new 
government. In addition to emphasizing the necessity for the 
full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, on which Tirana 
insisted earlier, the document stressed the necessity of “ethnic 
equality of the Albanian population” in Macedonia. (ibid.) At the 
same time, the initiative for the Albanian language to become 
the second official language in Macedonia was also promoted. 
Thus, a special law was adopted at the beginning of 2018 in 
the Sobranie. (Balkan Insight 2018) This paper focused on a 
necessary discussion about the existing symbols of Macedonia, 
its steady economic development, as well as the cultural rights 
of the Albanians. (RTS 2017) Particularly emphasized was the 
need to resolve the name dispute with Greece, and, in that 
connection, the inclusion of the Albanians and their political 
leaders. (ibid.) Also, the document insisted on establishing 
closer cooperation with Albania and Kosovo and accelerating 
the integration of this country into the EU and NATO. (ibid.)
After the disclosure of this document, it was clear that a new 
coalition would be formed in Macedonia, which the ruling 
VMRO-DPMNE was opposing for more than a decade. Also, 
the re-affirmation of specific issues concerning the rights of 
the Albanians has only homogenized nationalistic circles in 
the ethnic Macedonian corps and provoked a multitude of 
controversial appearances by then-state officials, as well as 
numerous tensions.
After the government of Prime Minister Zaev achieved some 
progress in relations with Bulgaria (2017) and then with Greece 
(2018), and as the process of amending the Constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia started in line with the agreement 
reached with Greece, the Albanian political parties have 
requested that the Ohrid Peace Accord be further emphasized 
in the Preamble of the Constitution, (Vlada na Makedonija 2018: 
amandman XXXIV) although it has been fully incorporated 
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changes. (Andonovski 2018: 23–49) During the discussion on 
the changes to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 
one of the delegates of the Alliance for Albanians proposed 
an amendment in which, next to Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, 
and Serbia, Kosovo would be listed as a neighbouring country 
of Macedonia. (RTK2 2018) In addition to Macedonia’s formal 
recognition of Kosovo in 2008, this would further confirm the 
tendencies in relations with Pristina, which were significantly 
useful, especially in the economy. (Marlov, Ivanova 2013: 259–
264) The new Macedonian Government has intensely supported 
the process of full normalization of relations between the 
authorities in Belgrade and Pristina, and it is frequently noted 
that without resolving this problem, it will not be easy to 
provide full regional stability. (Večernje novosti 2017)
In the following period, Albania will undoubtedly provide added 
support to Macedonia to join NATO after the implementation of 
the Prespa Agreement, which can be expected in 2020. However, 
initiating new issues such as the Macedonian symbols and 
the like, on the other hand, would not contribute to good 
relations between the Albanians and Macedonians in this 
country nor its relations with Albania. However, adoption of 
the law on the official use of the Albanian language at the state 
level of Macedonia at the beginning of 2018 confirmed the 
determination of the ruling SDSM and Prime Minister Zaev to 
improve relations with the Albanian population in the country.
b) First Significant Progress in Relations with Neighbouring 
countries – The Treaty between Macedonia and Bulgaria 
(1 August 2017)
The first noteworthy progress in relations with its neighbours, 
Macedonia achieved on 1 August 2017, with the signing of 
the Treaty on friendship, neighbourliness, and cooperation 
with Bulgaria. (Vlada na Makedonija, 2017) It was significant 
because of constant identity disputes with Bulgaria and the 
latent threats that it would use it as a blackmailing potential 
regarding Macedonia’s entry into the EU and NATO. This Treaty 
indeed represented an increasingly significant improvement 
in relations between the two countries.
This Treaty remarkably relieved the relations in the southeast 
of Europe and pointed to the necessity of addressing problems 
that carry an overly complex historical heritage. (ibid.: preamble) 
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and Macedonian language directly, but official languages  in 
Bulgaria and Macedonia following their constitutional acts. 
(ibid.: člen 14) In the context of creating a secure environment 
in South East Europe, both states agreed to strengthen bilateral 
cooperation, and Bulgaria would provide support when it comes 
to Macedonia’s entry into NATO and the European Union. (ibid: 
člen 2 i 3) Also, the two states agreed to closely cooperate when 
it comes to the work of international organizations and forums. 
(ibid., člen 3) Moreover, substantial attention in the Treaty 
was also dedicated to the strengthening of cooperation from 
local to central levels of government, as well as enhancing the 
cooperation in the field of tourism and infrastructure. (ibid.: 
člen 4 i 6) There was also the initiation of further cooperation 
through new bilateral agreements in the areas of “culture, 
education, health, social protection, and sport”. (ibid.: člen 8)
A special Joint Interdisciplinary Committee of Experts on 
Historical and Educational Issues has been set up to overcome 
numerous conflicting interpretations of specific periods of 
Macedonian and Bulgarian history. (ibid.: člen 8) Its goal was 
to analyse individual historical personalities and events and 
prevent opposite interpretations. At the same time, with this 
Treaty, Macedonia committed itself not to encourage in any 
way the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria to separatism. (ibid.: 
člen 11,5) This issue primarily referred to Pirin Macedonia, 
which was extremely important for Bulgaria, and a similar 
solution appeared later in agreement with Greece about Aegean 
Macedonia.
During 2017 and 2018, there has been considerable progress 
in Macedonia’s relations with Bulgaria, but the occasional 
misunderstandings regarding the Macedonian language 
reappeared in the public discourse of the authorities in 
Sofia. It seems that this issue, as well as the question of the 
interpretation of the history of the 20th century, will remain 
something that will be debated in the long run. (Radio Slobodna 
Evropa 2018) One cannot easily overlook these disagreements 
about history merely by the joint celebrations of Ilinden. Also, 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church is increasingly turning to the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which does not want to confront 
the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church 
regarding this issue. (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2017b)
c) The most significant breakthrough in Macedonia’s relations 
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June 2018)
In the broader historical sense, Macedonia was the most 
burdened with the dispute over its name with neighbouring 
Greece. Moreover, despite the numerous efforts to find a 
compromise after 1991 and thanks to Personal Envoy of the 
UN Secretary-General Matthew Nimetz, that did not happen. 
On the contrary, the parties have been very often far from 
the solution. Proportionally to that, there was a rise in the 
number of proposals for changing the name of Macedonia. 
During the year 1995, a provisional agreement was reached, 
which lasted for 24 years. (Interim Accord 1995) It stipulated 
that the Republic of Macedonia would be presented as “the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in the United Nations. 
(ibid.) This issue heavily burdened Macedonia’s foreign policy 
position and de facto slowed down its path to the EU and NATO 
membership, although it was the first of the Western Balkan 
states which embarked on this path in the middle of the 1990s. 
Macedonia was granted candidate status for membership in 
the European Union in November 2005 but has not opened the 
negotiation process since then. An analogous situation is with 
NATO because Greece did not allow Macedonia to be approved 
the membership invitation in 2008.
Former governments dominated by VMRO-DPMNE did not want 
to accept any change of the name, although the problem was 
only the “external” use of the state’s name, not the change of 
the constitution and the name for the internal use. With the 
arrival of the new SDSM-led government, dialogue with the 
official Athens intensified, which was followed by a specially 
strengthened role and engagement of the United States. The USA 
has encouraged both parties to finalise the dialogue, as well as 
to find the solution as soon as possible. Although there were 
presented various proposals to be added in front of the name 
Macedonia such as New/Upper/Vardar/Ilinden, the compromise 
which was achieved envisaged the name “Republic of North 
Macedonia”. (Danas 2018)
The agreement was signed on 17 June 2018 in Prespa, near the 
Macedonian-Greek border, by the premiers of the two countries 
and in the presence of many officials. It was based on earlier 
arrangements, intensification of bilateral cooperation, and 
the establishment of a strategic partnership between Greece 
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of the Macedonian national identity were preserved, such as 
the language for which it was specified that it belonged to the 
South Slavic group of languages. (ibid.: Article 1, 3b; Article 7,4) 
The determinant Macedonian and Macedonian citizenship 
were also preserved. (ibid.: Article 1, 3b) The first part of this 
agreement focused precisely on these identity issues, but it also 
referred to the principles of international law, membership in 
the United Nations, and good neighbourly relations. (ibid.: Part 
One) It has also been indicated the following: both sides would 
respect the state borders; both sides were against irredentism 
and secessionism; that they would not mingle in each other’s 
internal affairs; that they were against the use of the heritage of 
ancient Greek culture from the Macedonian side. (ibid.: Article 
4–8) In this regard, a special Commission would be formed, 
composed of experts in the field of history and education, to 
address the problems related to conflicting interpretations of 
history. (ibid.: Article 8, 5)
The second part of the agreement determined a whole spectrum 
of areas in which the strategic partnership of the two countries 
would be established. (ibid.: Part Two) Particularly significant 
was the rise of diplomatic relations between Greece and 
Macedonia at the level of ambassadors, which was a substitute 
for the existing liaison offices. (ibid.: Article 10) The agreement 
has also envisaged the strategic cooperation in international 
organizations and forums and political cooperation with 
the formation of a special high-level council to oversee and 
foster the partnership. (ibid.: Article 11) Boosting economic 
cooperation as well as “cooperation in the fields of education, 
science, culture, research, technology, health and sport” were 
highlighted as priorities of the future strategic partnership 
between Macedonia and Greece. (ibid.: Article 15) Also, there 
was the strengthening of interstate defence cooperation as well 
as cooperation in the field of civil protection. (ibid.: Article 16) 
Taking everything into account, it was an extensive list of areas 
for the strategic cooperation and the commitment of Skopje 
and Athens to enhance previously weak bilateral relations 
through such intense cooperation.
Based on this agreement, the Government of Macedonia 
organized a referendum on 30 September 2018, which was not 
legally binding, but it indeed revealed remarkably interesting 
mood indicators of the citizens. The majority voted to accept 
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did not attend the referendum (about 37%). (Dnevnik 2018) 
This, somehow, decreased the initial optimism regarding 
the implementation of the Prespa Agreement. However, 
it was quickly recovered. On 19 October, the Macedonian 
Government succeeded in gaining the consent of two-thirds 
of the deputy in the Sobranie and commencing the process 
of constitutional reforms under the Prespa Agreement. 80 of 
the 120 deputies voted in the state parliament to initiate the 
change of the Constitution of Macedonia. At the beginning of 
November, amendments were introduced to the Constitution 
of the Republic of Macedonia, which were aligned with the 
Prespa Agreement. Namely, the word “North” was added in 
front of the word Macedonia in the Constitution’s text while 
the second amendment highlighted the preamble reference to 
the inheritance of ASNOM, where the Ohrid Peace Agreement 
was also mentioned. (Vlada na Makedonija 2018)
The third amendment regulated the role of Macedonia towards 
its nationals residing abroad, but with the indication that it 
would not interfere with the internal affairs of other states 
regarding this issue. (ibid.: amandman XXXVI) Moreover, 
Macedonia was obliged to protect the historical and cultural 
heritage of the Macedonian people. (ibid.: amandman XXXVI)
It should also be noted the significant escalation of Greek 
nationalism, which manifested itself through mass protests 
and opposition to the agreement between Macedonia and 
Greece. (Garda 2018) Even so, there was still much pressure 
regarding the implementation of the Prespa Agreement, 
primarily from the EU and the United States. On 25 January 2019, 
the Greek Parliament adopted the Prespa Agreement, followed 
by changes in the Constitution and full implementation of the 
Prespa Agreement in Macedonia. There was a narrow majority 
in the Greek Parliament with only 153 votes in favour and 146 
against. (Blic, 2019)
On the other hand, we need to assess the real capacities and the 
extent of the announced strategic partnership between Greece 
and Macedonia. There is a possibility that this partnership 
might be more symbolic to relax the public of both countries 
to accept compromises. However, Macedonia received an 
invitation to join NATO on 12 July 2018, and there is a prospect of 
opening negotiations with the European Union in the coming 
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(self) isolation and the ultimate peripheral role in the Western 
Balkan region.
d) Relations between Macedonia and Serbia during 2017 and 
2018: good and bad oscillations
Relations between Macedonia and Serbia since 2012, i.e., the 
arrival of the Serbian Progressive Party to power in Belgrade, 
have been good. Moreover, it seemed that Serbia’s relations 
with this country were the most productive. (Simić, Đukanović, 
Živojinović 2013: 104–118) The said was confirmed by the visit of 
Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić to Macedonia in 2012 when 
he and Macedonian President Gjorgje Ivanov agreed to support 
the resolution of the inter-church dispute. (ibid.: 114) However, 
it was evident that the authorities in Belgrade still preferred 
VMRO-DPMNE and the misunderstandings with the new SDSM 
were deepened by the presence of one of the members of the 
Serbian intelligence service during the violent events in the 
Sobranie on 27 April 2017. (B92 2017)
Two and a half months after the inauguration of the new 
Government of Macedonia, in the second half of August 2017, 
a rather unusual situation happened when the entire Embassy 
of the Republic of Serbia had been withdrawn from Skopje due 
to not entirely clear circumstances. (Glas Amerike 2017) Despite 
the many media speculations, the real reason for this unusual 
act in the diplomatic practice remained unknown.
However, after a telephone conversation between President of 
Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, and Prime Minister of Macedonia, 
Zoran Zaev, on 23 August 2017, five points on inter-state relations 
were published in the official announcement. (RTS 2017a) 
They emphasized the necessity of mutual dialogue, which, 
despite specific differences, should contribute to the friendly 
relations of nations and states. (ibid.) In this joint statement, 
the intensification of economic and trade exchanges was also 
underlined, as well as the need to deepen regional cooperation 
and securing stability. (ibid.) Both sides have undertaken to 
further protect diplomatic and consular missions in their 
territory. (ibid.)
Another minor problem appeared in 2018 regarding the 
import of flour from Serbia to Macedonia, due to excise stamps 
on larger packaging, but it was temporarily solved. (N1 2018) 
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meeting of Vučić and Zaev in Belgrade, where good bilateral 
relations were confirmed. (RTS 2017b) On 2 September 2018, at 
their reunion at the Tabanovce/Preševo border crossing, there 
was an additional dissolution of relations. (Telegraf 2018) Both 
countries were ready to continue cooperating intensively 
in the field of European integration, and it was of immense 
importance that the Serbian president unambiguously 
supported the full implementation of the agreement between 
Greece and Macedonia. (ibid.)
However, there was still an open question of the relations 
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church, which would continue to remain 
predominantly in the sphere of relations between the two states 
due to the unwillingness of the SPC to achieve a compromise. 
(Helsinški bilten 2018) At the same time, at the beginning of 
the last decade, the Serbian Orthodox Church removed the 
memorial plaque of ASNOM in Prohor Pčinjski monastery in 
the south of Serbia. (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2017) Since 2003, 
Macedonian officials have not come to honour Ilinden, i.e., 
the day of ASNOM establishment. (ibid.) Another issue that can 
initiate further disagreement between Serbia and Macedonia 
is related to Macedonia’s entry into NATO, which is not entirely 
complementary to the foreign policy agenda of Serbia.
Conclusion
The new Macedonian government, constituted in 2017, 
succeeded in overcoming the numerous key bilateral 
issues with its neighbours just one year after its formation. 
Moreover, significant efforts have been made primarily for 
the consolidation of intra-ethnic circumstances between 
the Macedonians and Albanians, which was also transposed 
on Macedonia’s relations with neighbouring Albania. These 
relations are now promoted further, and there is no potential 
for blocking Macedonia’s entry into NATO, which has been 
debated in the official Tirana in previous years. A comparable 
situation is with Kosovo, with which the previous government 
had also well-regulated bilateral relations.
Of course, the most significant breakthrough of the new 
Macedonian Government has been achieved in its relation 
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of compromise even in terms of empathetic identity 
determinants, to which the name of the country for internal 
and external use belongs. Also, resetting the relations between 
Macedonia and Greece after a twenty-seven years-long dispute 
will undoubtedly contribute to the accelerated dynamics of the 
Euro-Atlantic integration of this country. It is confirmed by the 
strategic partnership between the two countries envisaged by 
the Prespa Agreement in several areas. This case has proven 
useful for overcoming some other similar issues in the Western 
Balkans region, especially when it comes to relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo. (Blic 2018) Furthermore, the determination 
and courage of the Macedonian political leadership to face the 
unpopularity of solving the significant problem of the name 
of the state, and to compromise it with neighbouring Greece 
should also be emphasized.
Credible public opinion polls showed primarily that the 
Prespa Agreement did not receive significant support from 
the Macedonian citizens. (Križalovski 2018) This was proved 
by a non-binding referendum on the Prespa Agreement, which 
was held on 30 September 2018, but also numerous researches 
over the past years. (Klekovski, Mihailovska, Jovanov 2018: 
26–42) Bearing in mind that the pre-referendum campaign in 
Macedonia lasted only three and a half months, one should not 
be surprised by the inadequate response from the citizens.
Also, considering that the state’s name issue represents an 
essential part of the foundations of the Macedonian national 
identity, one should not be surprised by a rather unconvincing 
majority that “copied” to the presidential elections in 
Macedonia on 5 May 2019. As a result, Stevo Pendarovski, as the 
candidate of the SDSM and the Albanian Democratic Union 
for Integration, won 51.6 percent in the second round, and the 
opposition candidate from VMRO-DPMNE, Gordana Siljanovska 
Dakova won 44.7 percent. (New Magazine 2019) However, this 
confirmed that the majority of the citizens after their initial 
negative attitude towards the Prespa Agreement gradually 
changed their views by identifying the only realistic option for 
the country in the policy of a clear Euro-Atlantic commitment, 
as well as good neighbourly relations in the Balkans.
Noteworthy progress has been made in the second half of 
2017 and during 2018 in the relations between Macedonia 
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sensitive, bearing in mind the historical context of relations 
and often the negative attitude towards Macedonian ethnic 
identity. However, the Agreement from August 2017 has further 
relaxed these relations and placed them in the context of 
Macedonia’s faster European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
Of course, specific issues such as different interpretations of 
history or the Macedonian language are to remain particular 
lines of separation between the official Sofia and Skopje.
Macedonia’s relations with Serbia were also very satisfactory 
in the past, even though Macedonia recognized Kosovo’s 
independence in 2008. (Đukanović 2016: 190) However, although 
it is not a predominantly global issue, it is clear that the relations 
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church remain the most significant problem. It 
mainly refers to the fact that the MPC demanded a mediating 
and “maternal” role from Bulgaria Orthodox Church during 
2018 to gain recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. (Al Jazeera Balkans 2018)
In general, as a particular country of the former Yugoslavia, 
which had problems with the new (Serbia) and old neighbours 
(Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania), Macedonia has managed to 
achieve a significant turnaround and progress improving these 
relations in a remarkably brief period since mid-2017. It also 
represents important encouragement regarding its accession to 
NATO and the EU, bearing in mind the EU Enlargement Strategy 
until 2025, where bilateral relations with neighbours are a 
priority. (European Commission 2018: 6–7) The full integration 
of the countries of the region into the Union, as anticipated 
by the strategy, will not be possible without resolving open 
issues with their neighbours. (ibid.: 7) The “case” of Macedonia 
can, therefore, represent a favourable model for the rest of the 
Western Balkans, given the whole multitude of unresolved 
bilateral problems of these countries. It should be noted that, 
apart from Macedonia, Serbia is also in an immensely complex 
situation regarding the regional context, and to a certain extent 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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